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rust in government is pivotal for gaining 
support for government policies, especially 
regarding taxing and spending (Beck, Rainey, & 
Traut, 1990; Beck & Dye, 1982; Lowery & Sigel-
man, 1981; Sears & Citrin, 1982; Rudolph, 2009; 
Hetherington, 2005). This is because citizens are 
more likely to support an expansion of government 
and the use of tax money if they believe that their 
government is trustworthy (Hetherington, 2005). 
Moreover, taxing and spending are central compo-
nents of the ideological positions that individuals 
take (Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan, & Sprague, 1999; 
Jacoby, 2000; Jacoby, 1991). Taken together, trust 
then acts as a heuristic device that provides clear 
signals to individuals to either support or oppose 
public policies, which is activated depending on the 
degree of ideological sacrifice an individual is asked 
to make (Rudolph, 2009; Rudolph & Evans, 2005; 
Jacobs & Matthews, 2017). 
Various forms of the trust-as-heuristic theory 
have been used to explain both policy preferences 
and behavioral outcomes across different issue-ar-
eas (Scholz & Pinney, 1995; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; 
Hetherington, 1999; Davis & Silver, 2004). In the 
contexts of government budgets, scholars have 
provided some evidence that the gap in ideological 
differences over the federal budget narrows among 
individuals with higher levels of trust in govern-
ment. On the spending side, Rudolph & Evans 
(2005) argue that trust is needed for conservatives 
to support spending policies because such policies 
require greater ideological sacrifice among con-
servatives than liberals. Using data from the 2000 
National Annenberg Election Survey, they find that 
trust in government is moderated by ideology, with 
trust mattering more to conservatives. On the rev-
enue side, Rudolph (2009) apply the same theory to 
explaining attitudes for Bush tax cuts and find that 
trust in government increases support only 
T 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Do liberals and conservatives who trust the government have more similar preferences regarding 
the federal budget than liberals and conservatives who do not? Prior research has shown that the ideological 
gap over spending increases and tax cuts narrows at high levels of trust in government. We extend this litera-
ture by examining whether the dampening effect of trust operates when more difficult budgetary decisions 
(spending cuts and tax increases) have to be made. Although related, a tax increase demands greater material 
and ideological sacrifice from individuals than tax cuts. The same logic can be applied to support for spending 
cuts. We test the trust-as-heuristic hypothesis using measures of revealed budgetary preferences from a pop-
ulation-based survey containing an embedded budget simulation. Our findings show that trusting liberals and 
conservatives share similar preferences toward spending cuts and tax increases, adding an important empiri-
cal addendum to a theory based on sacrificial costs. 
 
Keywords: Ideology, Budget Preferences, Revenue Preferences, Spending Preferences, Trust in Government, 
Interactive Budget Simulation  
Supplements: Open data, Open materials 
 
Journal of Behavioral  
Public Administration  
Vol 2(1), pp. 1-13 
DOI: 10.30636/jbpa.21.47 
Kim-Lee Tuxhorn*, John W. D’Attoma†, Sven Steinmo‡ 
 
 
Trust in government: Narrowing the ideological gap 
over the federal budget 
* Department of Political Science, University of 
Calgary;  
† Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC), 
University of Exeter Business School; 
‡ Department of Political Science, University of 
Colorado, Boulder 
Address correspondence to Kim-Lee Tuxhorn at 
(kimlee.tuxhorn@ucalgary.ca) 
Copyright: ©  2019. The authors license this article 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License. 
 
 
Research Article 
Tuxhorn et al., 2018 
 
2 
 
amongst liberal respondents. Together, the litera-
ture on trust, ideology, and budget policies suggests 
that trust in government dampens the ideological 
positions toward budget policies. But such a con-
clusion may be premature without further testing 
of the trust-as-heuristic theory in regards to sup-
port for tax increases and spending cuts. 
In this paper, we ask: Do liberals and con-
servatives who trust the government have more 
similar preferences regarding spending cuts and tax in-
creases than those with less trust in government? Alt-
hough fundamentally linked, voters may interpret 
increases and decreases to each side of the ledger as 
distinct debates. Arguably, spending cuts and tax 
increases are the more politically contentious sides 
of budget policy because they reduce important ser-
vices and require voters to chip in more. In the 
minds of voters, the decision to support tax cuts 
(spending increases) may be perceived differently 
than decisions about tax increases (spending cuts) 
(Franko, Tolbert, & Witko, 2013). Simply put, sup-
port for tax increases demands greater material and 
ideological sacrifice from voters, especially con-
servative voters, than tax cuts. While tax cuts may 
be seen as a difficult ideological sacrifice for liber-
als, the material sacrifice associated with a tax cut is 
less apparent because the costs are highly diffused. 
For this reason, Bartels (2005) argues that there was 
wide support for the Bush tax cuts despite the pol-
icy disproportionately benefitting wealthy voters. 
The same logic can be applied to support for 
spending cuts, reducing the services provided by 
the government. Though conservatives make an 
ideological sacrifice in support of policies that in-
crease spending, it is not necessarily the case that 
they will personally incur a material sacrifice as a 
direct result of these policies. Therefore, an exami-
nation of this untested extension–determining 
whether trust dampens the ideological divide over 
spending cuts and tax increases–serves as an im-
portant, and arguably, harder test of the trust-as-
heuristic theory, a theory that relies on the concept 
of sacrificial costs. 
We test this theoretical extension using newly 
collected data from an interactive budget simula-
tion in which respondents are asked to submit a 
budget that they would support. Rather than using 
general attitudinal questions as measures of budget 
preferences (e.g. do you support tax increases?), our 
measures are generated from the behavioral choices 
that respondents make during the simulation. Our 
simulation draws upon Bonica (2015) and extends 
it by providing respondents with both sides of the 
federal budget. In our simulation, respondents were 
only given the options to either increase taxes or 
cuts spending, as a way of forcing them to make 
difficult choices which would require an ideological 
and material sacrifice. We can thus test whether lib-
erals and conservatives who trust the government 
have more similar preferences regarding spending 
cuts and tax increases than liberals and conserva-
tives who do not. 
This paper makes two contributions to the on-
going development in this research program. The-
oretically, we extend the trust-as-heuristic perspec-
tive to explain attitudes toward the budgetary trade-
off between tax increases and spending cuts. The 
trust-as-heuristic framework is grounded in individ-
uals making material and ideological sacrifices. 
However, creating a sense of sacrifice has been a 
difficult task for researchers, especially when the 
sacrifice is seemingly abstract and emotionally dis-
tant from the participant (i.e. the national budget). 
In our simulation, we created these sacrificial costs 
by showing respondents that there was a budgetary 
deficit and then provided them with hard choices, 
increasing revenue and/or decreasing spending. 
Methodologically, we leverage budget simulations 
as a new way for social science researchers to study 
and measure budget preferences, as well as trade-
offs, by examining both sides of the budget side-
by-side. We believe our measure provides stronger 
external validity than the traditional survey since re-
spondents are making interactive choices. Finally, 
this study has important policy implications. As a 
society, we face a number of challenges, such as an 
aging population and climate change, which will re-
quire governments to make difficult trade-offs that 
are not always popular with their most ardent sup-
porters. Our study demonstrates, however, that the 
ideological gap on important budgetary trade-offs 
narrows among individuals who express trust in the 
government, which could make addressing these 
challenges palatable for even the most ideological 
individuals. 
 
Research Design 
 
Between June 7 and 20, 2017, we conducted a pop-
ulation-based online survey with 1,991 voting-age 
Americans using a general population-based panel 
provided by Survey Sampling International (SSI). 
The survey respondents were first presented with a 
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consent form and asked basic demographic infor-
mation such age, employment status, gender, and 
income. 
Then, before starting the budget simulation, 
respondents were given the following two para-
graph prompts about the national deficit and in-
structions on how the budget simulation works: 
 
“The U.S. Federal Government is in debt. In 2017 
the government is going to spend approximately 
$519 billion more than it will collect in taxes and 
other revenues. This 1/2 trillion dollars will be 
added to the debt total which is currently approxi-
mately 19 trillion dollars. To put this in perspective, 
the current debt of the U.S. Government is equal to 
approximately $45,000 for every American citizen. 
With the size of the deficit in mind, we would like 
to see how you personally would change Federal 
taxes and/or spending. We have created a “budget 
model” based on the actual Federal budget. In the 
model you will be able to cut spending in any cate-
gory where you believe that the Federal government 
spends too much money and/or increase revenues 
in any category where you think taxes should be 
raised. The basic idea is to allow you to change taxes 
and/or spending in the ways you prefer. The model 
will only allow spending cuts and/or increases in 
Federal taxes. You will have 10 minutes to complete 
the budget model. After completing the model, you 
will be returned to the survey and asked some fol-
low-up questions. Please click on the link below to 
begin the budget model.” 
 
It is important to note that we did not provide 
any cues or signals to respondents that they should 
submit a particular kind of budget, such as a bal-
anced budget. We provided information about the 
budget deficit to motivate respondents to submit a 
budget that they support. In one section of the in-
structions, for example, we state “We would like to 
see how you personally would change Federal taxes 
and/or spending.” Later in the simulation we rein-
force this point when we tell respondents, “the 
basic idea is to allow you to change taxes and/or 
spending in the ways you prefer.” 
The budget simulation contains both tax and 
spending items. Figure 1 is a screen capture of the 
online budget simulation used for this study. The 
tax-side contains six income brackets and an addi-
tional six categories including social security payroll 
Figure 1 
Screen Capture of Online Budget Simulation 
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and corporate income tax. Effective tax rates and 
revenue amounts were given for each tax item.1  On 
the spending-side of the budget we included nine 
broad spending categories and a total of 27 subcat-
egories. Each budget item included an information 
bubble with a short description to help clarify the 
contents of the item. Respondents could change 
any item in increments of 1% by clicking on “+” 
and “-” signs. 
Finally, though previous research by Rudolph 
& Evans (2005) and Rudolph (2009) has applied 
the interaction between the trust-as-heuristic and 
ideology to support for tax cuts and spending in-
creases, we believe that the results could be limited 
by the fact that the sacrifices related to tax cuts and 
spending increases are not great enough to elicit a 
strong enough response. Instead, we allow re-
spondents to only increase taxes and/or cut spend-
ing, and as such, we believe we can elicit a greater 
ideological and material sacrifice. 
The budget simulation has several desirable 
attributes as a research instrument to measure pref-
erences. First, it provides respondents with infor-
mation about both sides of the budget, and all the 
major categories and subcategories that constitute 
each side. Second, respondents receive instantane-
ous feedback about how their individual choices on 
a single item impact the overall budget. Third, the 
budget simulation logs how respondents interact 
with the individual lines in the federal budget, pro-
ducing a wealth of fine-grained information for re-
searchers. In particular, the simulation stores infor-
mation about which items of the budget are ad-
justed and the degree of adjustment for each item. 
Using the spending item “foreign military aid” as 
an example, data was collected on whether a re-
spondent reduced foreign military aid, and the ac-
tual dollar amount to which it is reduced.  
 
Hypothesis 
In studying spending and tax preferences sepa-
rately, Rudolph & Evans (2005) and Rudolph 
(2009) pose specific hypotheses about the moder-
ating effect of ideology on trust. Here, we general-
ize these hypotheses to test whether trust in gov-
ernment, as Rudolph & Evans (2005) put it, “erases 
the ideological gap” between liberals and conserva-
tives. We formally state our hypothesis as: 
 
H1: At higher levels of trust, there is no difference between 
liberals and conservatives in their preferences toward tax in-
creases. 
 
H2: At higher levels of trust, there is no difference between 
liberals and conservatives in their preferences toward spending 
cuts. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The budget simulation collects data on the number 
of items respondents adjust and the extent which 
they adjust each item. In general, data on whether 
an item (or items) has been adjusted is useful for 
studying budget preferences at the macro-level, 
such as explaining mass support for tax increases 
or spending cuts, while the dollar amount adjust-
ment on a particular item is useful for budgetary 
questions at the micro-level, like explaining support 
for health care spending. The reason for this 
macro-micro distinction relates to how the budget 
simulation is designed. Respondents are able to ad-
just items at 1% increments, but in terms of actual 
dollar amounts, a 1% incremental change varies by 
item depending on the initial allocations in the 
budget. For example, in terms of the actual dollar 
size of the federal budget, a 1% decrease in defense 
spending roughly equates to an 8% cut in education 
spending because spending on defense is currently 
about eight times larger than education spending. 
Therefore, measures using the total dollars adjusted 
(e.g. total spending cuts or total revenue increase) 
to summarize budget preferences at the macro-
level are more sensitive to small adjustments on big 
budget items like defense and less sensitive to sub-
stantively important adjustments on smaller items 
like education. 
Considering the macro-micro distinction in 
the data, we measure respondents’ support for tax 
increases and spending cuts at both levels. Starting 
at the macro-level, we use a simple count of the 
number of tax items each respondent adjusted (in-
creased) in the budget simulation, ranging from 0 
to 12 (labeled Tax Count). We create an equivalent 
count variable for the spending side, ranging from 
0 to 27 (labeled Spending Count). Without imposing 
assumptions on the data, all items in the budget 
simulation are included in the measures. Tax Count 
and Spending Count are general measures of how re-
spondents interacted with the budget simulation. 
Additionally, we analyze three spending varia-
bles and two revenue variables at the micro-level. 
These variables are continuous measures and ex-
pressed in terms of billions USD. On the spending 
side, we examine the amount of cuts respondents 
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5 
 
made to health care, economic security, and de-
fense.2  Higher values on these spending variables 
indicate greater cuts to these line items in the 
budget. On the revenue side, we focus on two 
measures of income tax. One measure is the in-
crease in total revenue from all six income tax 
brackets in our simulation. The second measure is 
the increase in total revenue from only the top two 
income categories (151k-741k bracket and over 
741k bracket). Higher values on these income tax 
variables indicate increased revenue from these cat-
egories. 
These spending and revenue categories were 
chosen based on the budgetary literature. Prior 
work has shown that liberals and conservatives 
tend to hold divergent positions on defense, health 
care, welfare, and progressive taxes.3  Correspond-
ingly, these expected differences bear out in our 
sample, finding statistically significant differences 
between liberals and conservatives across of these 
categories.4 Therefore, we believe that these cate-
gories represent an appropriate test for the argu-
ment that trust in government can narrow (even 
well-established) gaps between liberals and con-
servatives. 
 
Independent Variables 
The key independent variables in our analysis are 
trust in government and ideology. Similar to the 
“trust in government” question in the ANES, we 
asked, “How often can you trust the federal gov-
ernment in Washington to do what is right?” The 
five-point item included the follow responses: “al-
ways”, “most of the time”, “about half the time”, 
“sometimes”, “never”. Responses to this question 
are coded such that higher values indicate higher 
levels of trust in government. 5 We also modeled 
our seven-point ideology identification question af-
ter the ANES, “When it comes to politics, do you 
think of yourself as: very liberal, liberal, somewhat 
liberal, moderate or middle of the road, somewhat 
conservative, conservative, or very conservative?” 
We label this variable as Liberal, with higher values 
indicating more liberal. 
We also include a variable measuring the dif-
ficulty of the simulation because scholars have 
shown that respondents face cognitive constraints 
and optimization problems when asked to perform 
complicated tasks such as creating budgets 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 2007). This 5-point measure is 
labeled Budget Difficult, with higher values indicating 
that the simulation was more difficult for the re-
spondents than they had anticipated. Finally, sev-
eral socio-demographic control variables are in-
cluded to account for respondents’ income level, 
educational attainment, age, gender, race, and party 
ID. The exact question wording and the coding of 
these variables are included in the supplementary 
material. 
 
Results for Macro-Level Measures:  
Spending and Tax Count 
 
We begin with presenting the macro-level results. 
We model Spending Count and Tax Count using neg-
ative binominal regressions with standard errors 
clustered by state. Table 1 presents the results for 
these count measures.6 
On the spending side (Table 1, column 1), our 
results show that liberals (-0.664) are less likely to 
cut spending items compared to moderates (refer-
ence category) while conservatives (0.303) are more 
likely to cut spending. These findings are consistent 
with general expectations about ideological differ-
ences over government budgets. Our central inter-
est is whether both interaction terms take on the 
opposite sign as the ideology dummy variables. 
Though not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, 
the results conform to our expectations with the 
coefficient on LiberalxTrust obtaining a positive co-
efficient (0.103) and ConservativexTrust obtaining a 
negative coefficient (-0.019). 
Figure 2a shows the predicted count (y-axis) 
of spending items reduced for liberals and con-
servatives at different values of trust (x-axis). At the 
lowest levels of trust, conservatives are predicted to 
decrease about 10 spending items while liberals are 
predicted to decrease 4.4 items. As trust increases, 
the predicted difference in count between liberals 
and conservatives decreases and becomes statisti-
cally insignificant. In contrast to Rudolph & Evans 
(2005) who would expect the effect of trust to be 
more pronounced among liberals because spending 
cuts requires more ideological sacrifice on their 
part, our results suggest that trust dampens both 
sides of the ideological divide over spending cuts. 
On the tax side (Table 1, column 2), conserva-
tives take a reverse position (-0.503) and are signif-
icantly less likely to adjust revenue items compared 
to moderates. Notably, the difference between lib-
eral and moderates is not statistically significant 
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Table 1 
Explaining Support for Spending Cuts and Tax Increases 
 
 Spending Count Revenue Count 
Conservative 0.303* -0.503** 
 (0.136) (0.176) 
Liberal -0.664** -0.008 
 (0.184) (0.143) 
Trust in Gov. -0.063 
(0.047) 
-0.001 
(0.041) 
LiberalxTrust 0.103 0.026 
 (0.078) (0.055) 
ConservtivexTrust -0.019 0.124 
 (0.054) (0.064) 
Income 0.015* 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Education 0.006 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.020) 
Age -0.004* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Female -0.100* 0.045 
 (0.044) (0.034) 
White 0.012 0.038 
 (0.080) (0.051) 
Democrat -0.185** 0.078 
 (0.058) (0.044) 
Republican 0.032 0.034 
 (0.061) (0.082) 
Budget Difficult 0.106** 0.080** 
 (0.024) (0.017) 
Constant 1.908** 0.949** 
 (0.168) (0.154) 
ln(𝜶) -0.398** -0.944** 
 (0.052) (0.101) 
N 1305 1305 
Log-likelihood -3853.447 -3123.100 
BIC 7814.503 6353.809 
Notes: Entries report coefficients from negative binomial regression models and standard errors clustered by state 
in parentheses. Dependent variables are the counts of the number of spending and revenue items adjusted in the 
budget simulation. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.05 ; ** p<0.01. Statistically significant parameter ln(𝜶) 
indicates overdispersion. 
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at the 0.05 level, but the estimated difference be-
tween liberals and conservatives (0.480) is signifi-
cant at the 0.001 level. The interaction term Con-
servativexTrust is positive and statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level, indicating a dampening effect of 
trust on ideological differences. We assess the over-
all effect of trust among liberals and conservatives 
by examining the predicted counts. In Figure 2b, 
we can see that for respondents who never trust 
government, liberals are predicted to increase 4.13 
tax items while conservatives increase only 2.78. 
These ideological differences, in terms of tax items 
increases, become statistically indistinguishable at 
higher levels of trust. These results are analogous 
to the findings by Rudolph (2009) who finds that 
trust matters more to liberals over the issue of tax 
cuts because such policies demand more ideologi-
cal sacrifice from them. Consistent with the trust-
as-heuristic hypothesis, we find that trusting con-
servatives are willing to raise taxes.7  
 
Results for Micro-Level Measures:  
Allocations to Spending and Revenue  
Categories 
 
Does the attenuating effect of trust on ideological 
differences hold at the micro-level, that is across 
specific line items in the budget? We investigate this 
question by using ideologically divisive budgets 
items from both sides of the ledger. On the spend-
ing side, we examine the amount of cuts respond-
ents made to health care, economic security, and 
defense. On the revenue side, we examine the in-
creased revenue from income tax. The spending 
and revenue items are modeled using OLS regres-
sion because the measures are continuous (ex-
pressed in billions USD). We apply the same model 
specification as for the count models described 
above. 
We present the spending models in Table 2. 
The results on the ideological variables comport 
with general expectations. Conservative and liberals 
are statistically different from moderates across all 
three spending models. At low levels of trust, Con-
servatives are more likely to reduce spending on 
health care (100.721) and economic security 
(47.357) while liberals are more likely to reduce 
spending on defense (82.245). In health care and 
economic security models, the interaction terms on 
ConservativexTrust are negative and statistically sig-
nificant (-22.966, -10.100), indicating that higher 
levels of trust reduce spending cuts among con-
servatives. In the defense model, we find paralleling 
results with the interaction term on LiberalxTrust 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
In Figure 3, we plot the predicted amount of 
spending cuts for conservatives and liberals at dif-
ferent levels of trust. At low levels of trust, the dif-
ference between liberals and conservatives is statis-
tically significant. The figures show that the group 
Figure 2 
Predicted Count of Tax and Spending Items Adjusted by Ideology 
 
 
Figure 2a     Figure 2b 
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 Table 2 
Spending Cuts (in billions USD) by Category 
 
 Health Care 
Spending Cuts 
Economic Security 
Spending Cuts 
Defense 
Spending Cuts  
Conservative 100.721** 47.357** -48.120 
 (31.719) (11.221) (26.062) 
Liberal -41.125* -16.711* 82.245** 
 (19.804) (6.762) (25.546) 
Trust in Government -5.575 -1.392 -7.871 
 (6.134) (2.125) (8.079) 
LiberalxTrust 6.311 3.055 -18.788 
 (6.981) (2.700) (9.474) 
ConservativexTrust -22.966* -10.100* 8.261 
 (9.832) (4.139) (10.357) 
Income 1.194 1.263* -1.016 
 (1.238) (0.551) (1.104) 
Education 0.909 -0.714 4.277 
 (2.445) (1.003) (2.380) 
Age -0.850** -0.171* -0.939** 
 (0.173) (0.075) (0.151) 
Female -27.943** -4.309 -18.996** 
 (5.896) (3.287) (5.703) 
White 17.656** 5.080 -13.841 
 (6.253) (3.003) (11.454) 
Democrat -25.294** -9.507** -22.174* 
 (5.786) (3.213) (9.817) 
Republican -11.251 4.130 -21.841** 
 (12.635) (6.186) (4.454) 
Budget Difficult -8.558* -3.891* -15.477** 
 (3.344) (1.843) (2.197) 
Constant 121.798** 39.330** 191.736** 
 (29.889) (10.071) (24.747) 
N 1305 1305 1305 
𝑹𝟐 0.111 0.126 - 0.166 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 0.102 0.117 0.158 
Notes: Entries report OLS regression coefficients and standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. De-
pendent variables are expressed in terms of the US dollar amount reduced in each category. Statistical signifi-
cance denoted as: * p<0.05 ; ** p<0.01. 
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differences narrow at higher levels of trust and be-
come statistically insignificant at the highest levels. 
The results on revenues from income tax are 
presented in Table 3 and provide further evidence 
of the attenuating effect of trust on ideology. For 
both measures of income tax revenue, low trusting 
conservatives are statistically less likely to raise rev-
enue from income taxes than low trusting moder-
ates and liberals. The coefficient on Conservativex-
Trust obtains a positive sign, indicating that con-
servatives at higher levels of trust are more likely to 
raise revenue from income. We observe a similar 
dampening effect for liberals with a positive coeffi-
cient on liberal (113.210, 94.407) and a negatively 
signed coefficient on the interaction term (Liberalx-
Trust -32.164, -28.297). Figure 4 is a graph of the 
predicted revenues from income taxes for liberals 
and conservatives across different levels of trust. 
Similar to the prior results, we observe a narrowing 
difference in budgetary preferences among trusting 
liberals and conservatives.8 
Overall, our findings show that trust in gov-
ernment narrows the ideological divide over the 
federal budget with trusting liberals and conserva-
tives expressing similar preferences toward spend-
ing cuts and tax increases. 
 
Discussion 
 
In recent years, research on both budget prefer-
ences and trust in government has grown. Large 
government debt and deficits have led scholars to 
ask citizens about the extent to which they are will-
ing to pay taxes in order to fund these high levels 
of spending, while the expansion of trust literature 
Figure 3 
Predicted Spending Cuts on Health Care, Economic Security, and Defense  
(in billions USD) 
 
 
Figure 3a       Figure 3b 
 
 
Figure 3c 
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  Table 3 
Explaining Support for Spending Cuts and Tax Increases 
(Increased Revenue from Income Tax) 
 
 
Increased Revenue from All 
Income Tax Brackets 
Increased Revenue from Income Tax on High 
Earners Only 
Conservative -172.232** -156.381* 
 (62.398) (62.186) 
Liberal 113.210 94.407 
 (121.723) (110.855) 
Trust in Government -8.160 -17.322 
 (24.644) (23.325) 
LiberalxTrust -32.164 -28.297 
 (42.364) (39.155) 
ConservativexTrust 25.917 25.971 
 (22.970) (23.817) 
Income -4.510 -4.130 
 (3.919) (3.429) 
Education 19.426* 17.027* 
 (8.170) (7.504) 
Age 1.027 1.385* 
 (0.788) (0.668) 
Female 50.692 48.064 
 (35.739) (30.343) 
White -17.751 -12.745 
 (32.566) (26.421) 
Democrat 86.567 88.852* 
 (43.100) (38.687) 
Republican -53.485* -58.775* 
 (23.885) (22.866) 
Budget Difficult -48.955** -44.850** 
 (10.703) (9.472) 
Constant 2129.581** 1785.535** 
 (87.311) (74.170) 
N 1305 1305 
𝑹𝟐 0.084 0.091 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 0.075 0.082 
Notes: Entries report OLS regression coefficients and standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. De-
pendent variables are expressed in terms of the US dollar amount reduced in each category. Statistical signifi-
cance denoted as: * p<0.05 ; ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 2(1) 
 
 
11 
 
corresponds to the great increase in public distrust 
and polarization. We have demonstrated that these 
issues are not unrelated. 
Our results have important implications. The-
oretically, we demonstrate the trust-as-heuristic 
theory extends to issues that are arguably more 
contentious than support for tax cuts and spending 
increases. Moreover, our results demonstrate that 
trust in government is a valuable mechanism for de-
creasing public policy divisions among individuals 
who are the most ideologically opposed to those 
policies. Our findings also have important political 
implications. Our article demonstrates that by har-
nessing trust as an important resource, policy mak-
ers can garner support for public policies that might 
be unpopular amongst the more ideological seg-
ments of their base, which could lead to more mod-
erate policy outputs. 
This study sits well within an increasing body 
of literature in public administration that notes a 
large decline in public trust since World War II, 
while at the same time offering solutions as to how 
good public administration can improve trust 
(Wang & Wan Wart, 2007; Thomas, 1998; Tolbert 
& Mossberger, 2006). We believe that our paper 
not only sheds light on how trust in government is 
important for garnering wide support for public 
policies, but we also provide our interactive budget 
tool as one way that governments can engage citi-
zens, provide transparency, and improve trust. 
Finally, budget simulations provide a great 
deal of flexibility for scholars studying preference 
for taxes and spending. For future research we will 
remove the restrictions on respondents so that they 
are able to increase spending and decrease taxes. 
This allows us to makes our theories more general-
izable and sophisticated. Future research can also 
begin to examine how partaking in these types of 
exercises can increase political efficacy and civic en-
gagement. The possible utility of these tools is nu-
merous, providing benefits to policymakers, policy 
advocates, and scholars endeavoring to understand 
mass attitudes toward budgetary policies. 
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Notes 
 
1. See Appendix Tables for the complete list of 
tax and spending items. 
2. Health Care Cuts is calculated as the total re-
duction in spending from the following catego-
ries: Medicare, Medicaid, Affordable Care Act 
Subsidies, Employer Paid Health Insurance 
Exemption. In adopting the same language 
Figure 4 
Predicted Revenues Increases from Income Tax (in billions USD) 
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used in our budget simulation, we refer to wel-
fare spending cuts as Economic Security Cuts. 
Economic Security Cuts is calculated as the to-
tal reduction in spending from the following 
categories: Family and Nutrition Assistance, 
Housing Assistance, and Unemployment In-
surance. Defense Cuts is calculated as the total 
reduction in spending from the following cate-
gories: Military, Veterans Benefits. See Appen-
dix Table 3 for a detailed description of each 
line item. 
3. See Bartels (1994); Jacoby (1994); Henderson 
& Hillygus (2011); Ballard-Rosa, Martin, & 
Scheve (2017). 
4. Bivariate models comparing liberals and con-
servatives to moderates are shown in the sup-
plementary material. The results show that lib-
erals are statistically different than both con-
servatives and moderates across these budget 
items. 
5. Following Poznyak, Meuleman, Abts, & Bishop 
(2014), we chose this measure of trust over 
other ANES measures because it represents 
the broadest assessment of overall trust. Poz-
nyak et al. (2014) also find that other attitudinal 
questions on trust (e.g. crookedness and waste-
fulness) are time- and context-sensitive mean-
ing that they may be interpreted differently de-
pending on when the questions were asked. 
Rudolph (2009) uses the same measure of trust 
in their analysis on tax cuts. 
6. The full model results presented here are ro-
bust to varying model specifications. Addi-
tional model specifications are omitted here for 
space consideration and can be found in the 
supplementary material. Following the guide-
lines provided by Lenz & Sahn (2017), the sup-
plementary material includes results without 
additional covariates. 
7. Our results are robust to different measures of 
spending and revenue. In the supplementary 
material, we provide additional robustness 
checks by substituting the count measures with 
total spending cuts and total revenue increases. 
8. With the exception of social security spending, 
we find that trust attenuates the ideological gap 
found in education spending, infrastructure 
spending, foreign aid and diplomacy. In our 
sample, we do not find a statistically significant 
difference on social security cuts between lib-
erals and conservatives, a result consistent with 
the expectation that tax payers are not willing 
to cut social security spending. On the revenue 
side, we also find a statistically significant dif-
ference between the ideological groups over 
corporate tax and find that trust mitigates this 
difference. We do not find significant differ-
ences between liberals and conservatives on 
payroll tax, gas tax, estate tax, other taxes, or 
the cap on social security taxes. We interpret 
the non-significant differences on these other 
tax categories as tax payers’ strong aversion to 
taxes in general, regardless of whether the re-
spondent leans liberal or conservative. The 
supplementary material (Table 13) presents the 
results for these budgetary categories where we 
observed differences between liberals and con-
servatives. 
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